WeRise · Policy platform

Science & Research

Inventing Tomorrow
Science & Research: Australia cannot build a fair, secure and sustainable future while treating knowledge as an optional expense. Science and research are the infrastructure behind healthier lives, climate resilience, clean industry, public services and national capability – but Australia invests too little, too erratically and too narrowly in the people and institutions that make discovery possible. WeRise will build a durable national research compact: fund curiosity as well as application, give researchers secure careers, connect public research to public needs, and ensure the benefits of Australian knowledge remain available to Australians. Inventing tomorrow means investing in it today – openly, patiently and for everyone.
WR-LB02
In development

Key findings

  • 1.69% of GDPAustralia spent 1.69% of GDP on research and development in 2023–24 – less than the 2.24% share reached in 2008–09. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics · Research and Experimental Development, Businesses, Australia · 2025
  • $45.1 billionTotal Australian R&D spending reached an estimated $45.082 billion in 2023–24, but the investment share of the economy barely moved. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics · Research and Experimental Development, Businesses, Australia · 2025
  • 13.8%Only 666 of 4,842 NHMRC competitive-grant applications were funded in 2023 – more than six in seven applications missed out. Source: National Health and Medical Research Council · Outcomes of Funding Rounds · 2023
  • 31%Women made up only 31% of Australia’s STEM-industry workforce in 2025, showing that a future-focused research system still excludes too much talent. Source: Department of Industry, Science and Resources · STEM Equity Monitor Summary Report · 2026

Part 01

The Case for Change

Why Science & Research matters

Knowledge Is National Infrastructure

Australia’s future depends on the discoveries we choose to fund before the crisis arrives.

Australia relies on science every day, often without naming it. Clean drinking water, bushfire forecasting, safer workplaces, medical treatments, crop science, disability technologies, transport systems, telecommunications and renewable energy all depend on long chains of research. Yet the nation continues to treat research funding as discretionary: something to trim in difficult budgets, distribute through short-term competitions, or justify only once a commercial payoff is obvious.

That is backwards. The greatest value of research is often impossible to predict in advance. Fundamental research may take decades to become a vaccine platform, a climate model, a new material, a public-health intervention or an industry. Its uncertainty is precisely why the public must help fund it. Private firms have legitimate reasons to focus on nearer-term returns; governments have a different responsibility – to fund the knowledge, people and institutions that markets systematically underprovide.1

Australian gross expenditure on R&D was estimated at $45.082 billion in 2023–24, equal to 1.69% of GDP.4 That figure is substantial in isolation, but it conceals a long-term decline in national ambition: R&D intensity was 2.24% of GDP in 2008–09.4 A country facing climate disruption, an ageing population, economic concentration, strategic vulnerability and rapid technological change cannot afford to spend a smaller share of its national capacity on understanding and shaping those forces.

The most persistent weakness is business investment. Business expenditure on R&D was $24.410 billion in 2023–24, but at 0.9% of GDP it was unchanged from 2017–18.5 The point is not to blame individual firms. Australia’s economic structure – dominated by resource extraction, property, finance and small businesses – does not automatically create the dense research, manufacturing and patient-capital ecosystems found in more R&D-intensive economies. That is why public policy must do more than offer a tax concession and hope the system coheres.

Australia has powerful research institutions but unstable pathways between discovery and public use. Universities performed $16.404 billion in R&D in 2024, or 0.59% of GDP.8 They produce much of the country’s basic research, train researchers and support regional communities. But public grants are intensely rationed. In 2023, NHMRC funded 666 of 4,842 competitive grant applications: a 13.8% success rate.2 This does not mean the other 4,176 applications lacked merit. It means the funding pool forced thousands of credible research projects into a lottery-like contest.

The human cost of this model is substantial. Researchers spend months preparing applications instead of doing research, mentoring students, building partnerships or sharing findings with communities. Early-career researchers face repeated short contracts. Researchers in regional, smaller and less commercially connected institutions are disadvantaged. Women remain underrepresented in the STEM workforce: in 2025 they made up 31% of STEM-industry workers, while women comprised 27% of ARC and 39% of NHMRC STEM research applicants.9 A research system that loses people through insecurity and exclusion weakens the very capacity it claims to build.

WeRise proposes a different settlement: stable core funding for public research; a legislated trajectory toward 3% of GDP in total R&D investment by 2035; an independent national research and innovation framework; stronger ARC and NHMRC funding indexed to real research costs; and public-interest translation pathways that retain benefits in Australia. This is not science for science’s sake alone. It is science for better care, safer communities, a liveable climate, democratic sovereignty and the right of future generations to inherit more options than we had.

Part 02

Evidence and Experience

Science & Research: what other countries show

What Long-Term Research Systems Look Like

Germany · South Korea · Finland · United Kingdom

No overseas system can be copied directly into Australia. Nations differ in economic structure, population, geography, constitutional arrangements and industrial history. But the best comparison systems show common features: long-term public investment, institutions protected from annual political churn, mission-oriented coordination, broad support for discovery research, active industry participation and a deliberate approach to research careers and infrastructure. Australia’s challenge is not to import another country’s bureaucracy. It is to adopt the disciplines successful systems share: stable funding, clear public goals, genuine regional and industrial capability, and evaluation focused on long-term public value rather than short-term announcements.

Germany · 2005–present; Pact for Research and Innovation, current phase 2021–2030

The Pact provides predictable annual funding growth for major non-university research organisations, including the Max Planck Society, Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, Helmholtz Association and Leibniz Association; the current pact sets a 3% annual increase in institutional funding. Four major national research organisations, hundreds of institutes and sustained federal–state co-funding.

  • Germany’s Pact for Research and Innovation provides annual 3% growth in institutional funding through 2030.
  • The program supports both fundamental research and applied industrial research through distinct but connected organisations.
  • Fraunhofer’s model combines public base funding with contract research for firms and government, helping bridge research and application.
  • Germany spent about 3.1% of GDP on R&D in 2023.

Australia should establish multi-year, indexed funding agreements for CSIRO, ANSTO, AIMS, Geoscience Australia, the National Measurement Institute and university research infrastructure. A stable public institutional base allows agencies to retain specialist capability, respond to emergencies and work on long-horizon research that cannot survive grant-by-grant funding.

Primary source

South Korea · 1990s–present; current national R&D and innovation strategies

Large-scale public and private R&D investment, targeted technology missions, public research institutes and industrial policy supporting semiconductors, digital technologies, batteries, biotechnology and green transition industries. National system with R&D spending exceeding 5% of GDP in recent OECD data.

  • Korea has sustained one of the highest R&D intensities among OECD economies, exceeding 5% of GDP in recent years.
  • Business enterprises perform the dominant share of Korea’s R&D, supported by strong industrial clusters and public strategic investment.
  • Government policy links research investment to manufacturing capability, skills and export-oriented industry development.
  • Korea demonstrates that high R&D spending depends on long-term industrial institutions, not one-off innovation grants.

Australia should not simply chase Korea’s headline spending ratio; its economy and industrial history differ markedly. But its experience shows that research policy works best when aligned with manufacturing, skills, procurement, infrastructure and regional development – cross-links directly relevant to WR-EW02 Manufacturing, WR-LB01 Education and WR-PF01 Climate & Energy.

Primary source

Finland · 2010s–present; RDI Roadmap and parliamentary R&D funding law

A statutory commitment to raise R&D expenditure to 4% of GDP by 2030, supported by multi-year national planning and public R&D appropriations. National target spanning government, universities, public research institutes and business.

  • Finland enacted legislation designed to support a national target of R&D expenditure at 4% of GDP by 2030.
  • The Finnish approach uses parliamentary planning to reduce uncertainty and create a long-term investment path.
  • The target explicitly requires business investment to grow alongside public investment.
  • The model recognises that long-term research capacity cannot be built through annual budget cycles alone.

A legislated Australian R&D pathway should set a transparent target and require annual reporting against public, higher-education, government and business components. The target should be paired with equity, public-interest, regional and climate-resilience measures so it does not become a simple subsidy to incumbent corporations.

Primary source

United Kingdom · 2021–present; UK Innovation Strategy, UK Research and Innovation system

UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) coordinates public research and innovation funding through nine councils, Innovate UK and Research England, alongside a national ambition to raise total R&D expenditure to 2.4% of GDP. UKRI distributes multi-billion-pound annual funding across research councils, innovation programs, infrastructure and university research.

  • UKRI brings research councils, innovation funding and university research support into a common national framework.
  • The United Kingdom set a target of total R&D investment reaching 2.4% of GDP by 2027.
  • Innovate UK uses grants, loans, procurement and challenge programs to help businesses develop and scale innovations.
  • The UK model demonstrates both the value and limits of central coordination: governance must be matched by adequate, stable real funding.

Australia needs stronger coordination between ARC, NHMRC, CSIRO, industry programs and public procurement, but should avoid centralisation that sidelines investigator-led research or the humanities and social sciences. A national council should publish transparent priorities, retain independent peer review and include states, territories, First Nations representatives, workers and civil society.

Primary source

Part 03

Costs and Trade-offs

The cost of Science & Research

Investment, Not a Blank Cheque

The real question is whether Australia can afford not to build research capacity.

Science policy must distinguish gross expenditure from net public cost. A national target such as 3% of GDP means total R&D performed by businesses, universities, governments and not-for-profit institutions – not simply a Commonwealth budget appropriation. Australia’s starting point is estimated total R&D expenditure of $45.082 billion, or 1.69% of GDP, in 2023–24.10 Reaching 3% by 2035 would require both public and private investment to rise over time, with exact annual costs dependent on GDP growth, inflation, tax-incentive design and the level of business participation. Any precise 2035 dollar figure should therefore be treated as a projection until a fully costed Treasury model is published.

The Commonwealth already supports R&D through direct spending, grants, public institutions and the R&D Tax Incentive. The Parliamentary Library estimated total government R&D support at $14.4 billion in 2024–25, including budget allocations and tax incentives.11 The 2026–27 Budget says it will guide more than $39 billion in R&D investment, but this broader figure should not be treated as directly comparable to ABS GERD without a published reconciliation of definitions and time periods.12

WeRise should commit to publishing a fully costed ten-year research investment plan before implementation. The plan should specify new public funding, projected private co-investment, tax-expenditure changes, administration, regional distribution and evaluation benchmarks. It should not claim that every dollar of research funding returns a fixed amount to GDP. Research has economic returns, but its greatest public returns – including lives saved, climate risks avoided and knowledge held in common – cannot be reliably reduced to one multiplier.

ItemAmountNote
Baseline total Australian R&D expenditure, 2023–24-$45.082 billionTotal estimated R&D performed across business, government, higher education and private non-profit sectors; this is a baseline, not a Commonwealth outlay.
Baseline R&D intensity, 2023–241.69% of GDPStarting point for a legislated national trajectory toward 3% of GDP by 2035.
Indicative additional national R&D intensity required+1.31 percentage points of GDPDifference between the 2023–24 1.69% baseline and a 3% national target; the dollar value depends on future GDP.
Government R&D support, 2024–25-$14.4 billionParliamentary Library estimate including government budget allocations for R&D and R&D tax incentives; not directly interchangeable with ABS expenditure data.
2026–27 science capability package-$1.5 billionBudget commitment to strengthen institutions including CSIRO, National Measurement Institute, Australian Space Agency and Square Kilometre Array.
MRFF annual disbursement-cap increase-$350 million per year by 2030–31Annual cap scheduled to rise from $650 million to $1 billion, subject to the announced health and medical research strategy process.
Potential productivity, resilience and health offsetsNot reliably monetisedDo not book speculative returns as budget savings; evaluate benefits through published outcome measures and independent review.
Net cost estimate rowTo be independently costedWeRise should publish Treasury/PBO-style costing before adopting final annual appropriations; no credible net-cost figure can be claimed from currently available public evidence.

The strongest objections to Science & Research

The strongest objection is fiscal: Australia has urgent demands in health, housing, social security, disaster recovery and defence, so increased research funding could displace spending that delivers more immediate benefit.

This is a real trade-off. A research strategy should not hide costs behind vague claims that “innovation pays for itself.” The response is to sequence investment, publish independent costings, identify funding sources and measure outcomes. Research is not a substitute for housing or healthcare investment; it supports better housing materials, health treatments, climate resilience and public systems. WeRise should therefore frame research as complementary infrastructure, not as a magic solution.

A second objection is that a 3% of GDP target is arbitrary and risks becoming a headline detached from quality.

That risk is genuine. R&D expenditure measures inputs, not whether research is ethical, useful, inclusive or well-governed. Countries can spend heavily on military technologies, proprietary platforms or projects with weak public value. The target should be treated as a long-term capacity benchmark, accompanied by public-interest tests, independent evaluation, open-science standards, social and environmental safeguards, and disaggregated reporting. A target without governance is inadequate; governance without adequate resources is equally inadequate.

A third objection is that government should not pick winners.

The concern is that mission-led policy could direct money toward politically fashionable technologies, crowd out private investment, or create wasteful subsidies for well-connected firms. Australia has examples of poorly designed industry assistance, so this cannot be dismissed. The answer is to distinguish broad mission-setting from ministerial micromanagement. Government already shapes markets through procurement, regulation, infrastructure, tax and public services. It should do so transparently, using independent expert advice, open competitive processes, conflict-of-interest rules and public evaluation. At the same time, a substantial share of funding must remain investigator-led and curiosity-driven.

A fourth objection is that commercialisation policy could compromise academic independence or turn universities into corporate contractors.

This is also a real danger. Academic freedom, open publication, research integrity and the humanities must not be subordinated to patent counts or start-up valuations. Public-interest translation should complement, not colonise, research. Agreements must protect publication rights, Indigenous data sovereignty, public access where appropriate, affordability of publicly funded products and Australian capability. Success should include policy change, public-health improvement, environmental protection and cultural knowledge – not only intellectual-property revenue.

A fifth objection is that Australia lacks the industrial base to absorb significantly more R&D, so public money would simply subsidise overseas-owned corporations or trigger talent flight.

The evidence supports concern about translation gaps. But underinvestment is not a solution to weak absorption capacity; it entrenches it. The policy must therefore connect research spending to local procurement, skills, manufacturing, regional institutions, patient finance, co-operative and public ownership models, and conditions on public funding. Research can leave the country if policy is passive. It is more likely to build Australian capability when public institutions deliberately create places for it to land.

Finally, international comparisons have limits.

Germany, Finland, Korea and the United Kingdom have different populations, industries and political systems. Their programs are evidence of possible institutional designs, not off-the-shelf templates. Australia must build a system suited to its geography, federal structure, First Nations responsibilities, regional inequality, climate exposure and civic values.

Part 04

The Australian Design

How Science & Research would work in Australia

A National Research Compact

Stable public funding, public purpose and Australian capability.

WeRise would establish a ten-year National Research Compact, designed to lift Australia’s total R&D effort toward 3% of GDP by 2035 while making the system more secure, democratic and useful. The target would cover all R&D performers – business, government, higher education and private non-profit institutions – because a research system cannot be rebuilt by Commonwealth grants alone. Australia’s estimated R&D intensity was 1.69% of GDP in 2023–24; any credible path to 3% requires coordinated public investment, responsible business participation and transparent annual reporting.10

At the Commonwealth level, WeRise would create an independent National Research, Innovation and Public Purpose Council, drawing on but improving the coordination role proposed through the 2026 National Resilience and Science Council.12 Its legislated duties would be to publish a national R&D roadmap; set transparent public missions; report annually on expenditure, workforce, regional distribution, equity, open access and outcomes; and advise Parliament – not merely Cabinet – on whether governments are meeting their commitments. It would include researchers, First Nations representatives, workers, states and territories, disability advocates, regional communities, small business, public-interest civil society and industry.

The Compact would provide multi-year, indexed institutional agreements for CSIRO, ANSTO, AIMS, Geoscience Australia, the National Measurement Institute, the Australian Space Agency, research infrastructure and national collections. The 2026–27 Budget has committed $1.5 billion to strengthen science capabilities and institutions; WeRise would make that approach transparent, recurrent where necessary and linked to published capability plans.12 Public research agencies must have capacity for long-horizon work, independent advice and emergency response – not only contract work shaped by the priorities of the day.

Universities would receive a rebuilt discovery-research settlement. WeRise would increase and index ARC and NHMRC funding, simplify grant administration, support investigator-led research across STEM and humanities and social sciences, and fund a proper share of indirect research costs. Peer review must remain independent. Government should identify broad public missions – such as climate adaptation, health equity, clean industry, housing, care, biodiversity and digital sovereignty – without requiring every researcher to fit a ministerial priority.

The policy would also create public-interest translation pathways: mission-based grants, shared research infrastructure, patient capital, challenge procurement and Australian-benefit conditions for publicly funded intellectual property. Public procurement should become an early customer for demonstrably useful Australian research, particularly in health, climate resilience, water, accessible technology and regional services. These mechanisms should complement – not replace – basic research.

Implementation should occur in stages. In the first 12 months, government would legislate the Council, publish a baseline expenditure map and commission independent costing. Years 2–4 would restore core grant capacity, negotiate agency compacts and establish public missions. Years 5–10 would scale investment against annual targets and independent evaluation. States and territories would remain essential partners through universities, hospitals, TAFEs, infrastructure, planning, public laboratories and local innovation ecosystems.

Part 05

People and Transition

Who Science & Research affects

The People Behind the Breakthroughs

Research policy is workforce policy, regional policy, health policy and generational policy.

Everyone benefits from a capable research system, but the consequences of underinvestment are not evenly distributed. Communities facing heat, flood, disease, disability barriers, poor transport, insecure work or regional service gaps need research tailored to their circumstances – not innovations designed solely for profitable markets. Public research is especially important where people cannot pay privately for solutions or where benefits are shared across whole communities.

Researchers and research-support staff are directly affected. Australia’s system depends not only on principal investigators but on technicians, lab managers, research nurses, software engineers, data managers, librarians, field workers, ethicists and professional staff. Competitive and short-term funding makes these careers precarious. It also wastes accumulated knowledge when people leave research between grants. A stable funding settlement would benefit early-career researchers, mid-career researchers facing repeated funding gaps, and regional institutions with less access to philanthropic and commercial cross-subsidy.

Case study

A doctoral graduate in environmental science is employed on a 12-month contract monitoring flood recovery in northern Queensland. Her work helps councils understand river systems, but she spends the final months of each contract applying for the next role. Without predictable project funding and career pathways, she considers leaving research for unrelated work. The loss is not merely personal: local communities lose an experienced scientist who understands their region.

Women and other underrepresented groups face distinct barriers. Women made up 31% of STEM-industry workers in 2025, around 300,000 of a STEM workforce of approximately 1.8 million. They accounted for 27% of ARC STEM research applicants and 39% of NHMRC applicants.13 These figures do not prove discrimination in every institution, but they demonstrate a system that is not drawing equally on the country’s talent. WeRise would require equity impact reporting for major public research funding, support secure career pathways, improve paid caregiving and leave arrangements, and fund accessibility in research workplaces and fieldwork.

Case study

A regional community-controlled health organisation wants to partner with a university on a diabetes-prevention program designed by and for local First Nations families. The community has the knowledge and relationships; the university has research capability. Under a short grant cycle, neither can afford the time to build governance, data sovereignty arrangements and long-term trust. A mission-based, multi-year partnership fund would allow the work to proceed on community terms.

Small businesses, co-operatives, social enterprises and public-service innovators also lose when research translation is designed around large firms or venture-capital expectations. The R&D Tax Incentive is valuable but can be difficult to navigate; it currently requires at least $20,000 in eligible annual expenditure, with different provisions for recognised research service providers and CRC contributions.14 The 2026–27 Budget announced substantial changes, including a proposed increase in the refundable-offset turnover threshold from $20 million to $50 million.15 These changes require close scrutiny to ensure they expand genuine research rather than simply increase the value of claims.

Opposition is likely from fiscal conservatives concerned about cost, firms opposed to public-benefit conditions, institutions resistant to transparency, and some researchers concerned that national priorities could undermine independent inquiry. Those concerns are legitimate design challenges. The answer is not central planning of every idea; it is a system where public money comes with stable rules, independent peer review, democratic oversight and a clearer return to the public that funded it.

Notes

Sources and Supporting Documents

  1. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Research and Experimental Development, Businesses, Australia, 2023–24. Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2025. abs.gov.au
  2. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Research and Experimental Development, Higher Education Organisations, Australia, 2024. Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2026. abs.gov.au
  3. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Research and Experimental Development, Government and Private Non-Profit Organisations, Australia, 2024–25. Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2026. abs.gov.au
  4. Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources. Ambitious Australia: Strategic Examination of Research and Development Final Report. Australian Government. 2026. industry.gov.au
  5. Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources. STEM Equity Monitor Summary Report 2026. Australian Government. 2026. industry.gov.au
  6. National Health and Medical Research Council. Outcomes of Funding Rounds. Australian Government. 2024. nhmrc.gov.au
  7. Australian Research Council. NCGP Trends: Success Rates. Australian Government. 2026. arc.gov.au
  8. Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources. Research and Development Tax Incentive: Overview. Australian Government. 2026. business.gov.au
  9. Australian Government Treasury. 2024–25 Tax Expenditures and Insights Statement. Australian Government. 2024. treasury.gov.au
  10. Australian Government. Budget Paper No. 1: Budget Strategy and Outlook, 2026–27. Commonwealth of Australia. 2026. budget.gov.au
  11. Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library. R&D and Innovation in Australia: 2024 Update. Parliament of Australia. 2026. aph.gov.au
  12. Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library. Understanding R&D and Innovation Metrics. Parliament of Australia. 2025. aph.gov.au
  13. Australian Economic Accelerator. Annual Report on Research Translation and Commercialisation 2024–25. Australian Economic Accelerator. 2025. aea.gov.au
  14. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D by Sector of Performance and Type of R&D. OECD Data Explorer. 2026. data-explorer.oecd.org
  15. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD Economic Surveys: Australia 2023. OECD Publishing. 2023. oecd.org
  16. Australian Academy of Science. A Starting Point, Not a Solution: The 2026–27 Budget for Australian Science. Australian Academy of Science. 2026. science.org.au
  17. Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering. 2026–27 Federal Budget Wrap. ATSE. 2026. atse.org.au
  18. Group of Eight Australia. Australia’s Research and Development Intensity: A Decadal Roadmap to 3% of GDP. Group of Eight Australia. 2024. go8.edu.au
  19. Australian Academy of Science. Budget Signals Support for Ambitious Reform for Australian Science. Australian Academy of Science. 2026. science.org.au
  20. Australian Academy of Health and Medical Sciences / AAMRI. Analysis: 2026–27 Federal Budget Summary. AAMRI. 2026. aamri.org.au

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