Broadband & Connectivity

The cost of Broadband & Connectivity

Pay for Connection – Or Pay for Exclusion

Broadband is capital infrastructure, but meaningful access also requires recurring support.

Australia has already made a large public commitment to national broadband. By 30 June 2025, the Commonwealth had provided NBN Co with $31.8 billion of available equity funding under its equity funding agreements, out of a total available amount of up to $34.9 billion.⁹ NBN Co reported FY25 capital expenditure of $3.501 billion, including $1.6 billion for fibre modernisation, $497 million for network infrastructure and capacity, and $487 million for fixed-wireless and satellite upgrades.¹¹ These are large figures, but they should be treated as investment in a continuing national utility, not as proof that the task is complete.

The next policy phase has two distinct costs. First, infrastructure costs: fibre upgrades, regional backhaul, mobile coverage, resilient power and transmission, community Wi-Fi where appropriate, and high-quality remote connectivity. Second, inclusion costs: affordable retail plans, device access, skills programs, accessible design, local support workers and emergency backup. The first without the second leaves people connected in theory but excluded in practice.

NBN Co’s capital expenditure is not a cost estimate for the WeRise program, because the final policy scope has not yet been designed. It would be misleading to invent a total price before defining minimum service standards, locations, technology choices, affordability thresholds and the contribution expected from commercial operators. The policy should therefore publish a costed Universal Connectivity Guarantee within its first 12 months, independently audited and updated annually.

There are measurable offsets. NBN Co earned $5.483 billion in telecommunications revenue in FY25, while total revenue under its Special Access Undertaking was $5.496 billion.¹² This does not eliminate public investment, but it demonstrates that public network infrastructure can produce recurrent income. Economic and social benefits – such as higher labour-force access, lower travel needs, better service delivery and stronger regional business capacity – are real but should not be converted into a national dollar saving without a transparent Australian model.

The strongest objections to Broadband & Connectivity

The strongest objection is cost.

Extending high-quality, resilient connectivity to every premise in a continent-sized country is expensive, particularly in remote areas where maintenance, backhaul, energy supply and terrain raise costs. Australia has already committed large public sums to NBN Co, with $31.8 billion in Commonwealth equity provided by June 2025.⁹ A new guarantee could become another open-ended infrastructure liability if its obligations are vague. The response must be disciplined design: define a minimum socially adequate service, allow technology-neutral delivery, target high-cost subsidies to demonstrated market failure, publish all costs and reassess standards regularly.

A second objection is that fixed broadband may become obsolete as mobile, low-Earth-orbit satellite and wireless technologies improve.

It is true that technology is changing quickly, and some locations may receive excellent service through wireless or satellite. This supports a technology-neutral guarantee; it does not justify abandoning fixed infrastructure. Fibre remains important for capacity, reliability, long-term upgradeability and backhaul. The policy should avoid locking Australia into one technology while maintaining a clear preference for the technology that delivers the best verified service over the infrastructure lifecycle.

Third, there is a risk of overbuilding or distorting competition.

Publicly funded networks can duplicate commercially viable infrastructure, discourage private investment or favour incumbents. This concern is particularly relevant where new subsidy programs overlap with NBN Co, mobile operators and satellite providers. The response is open, transparent mapping; competitive procurement; public-interest tests; wholesale-access obligations where appropriate; and targeted intervention only where service is absent, unaffordable, unreliable or inadequate for essential participation.

Fourth, universal connectivity can deepen harms if digital services become compulsory, inaccessible or surveillant.

A person may have an internet connection but still be excluded by an inaccessible government portal, confusing identity checks, automated decision-making, scams, data harvesting or lack of human alternatives. This is a significant policy limitation. WR-SM03 must be implemented alongside WR-DR03 Digital Rights & Privacy, and public institutions must retain accessible non-digital pathways for essential services. Connectivity should expand choice, not create an obligation to surrender privacy or navigate systems alone.

Fifth, digital inclusion statistics require careful interpretation.

The Australian Digital Inclusion Index is a rigorous and useful benchmark, but its composite index is not the same as a direct count of households without internet. A person classified as excluded may have some access but face affordability or ability barriers. Conversely, a household counted as connected may have a poor-quality or shared service inadequate for its needs. Policy evaluation should therefore use multiple measures: service availability, affordability relative to income, speed and reliability testing, device access, digital confidence, accessibility and lived-experience research.

Finally, network resilience carries trade-offs.

Redundancy, battery backup, mobile resilience and community hubs cost money and may be underused in ordinary conditions. But climate-driven disasters, power outages and emergencies make these investments a form of social insurance. The appropriate approach is risk-based: prioritise hospitals, emergency facilities, remote communities, disaster-prone regions and people dependent on connected health or support services.