WeRise · Policy platform
Co-operatives & Community Ownership
Key findings
- 1,834 active co-operatives and mutualsAustralia already has a large member-owned economy, but its scale is often absent from economic policy debate. Source: Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals · National Mutual Economy Report 2025 · 2025 []
- $184.4 billion annual turnoverAustralia’s co-operative and mutual sector already generates annual turnover larger than many industries routinely treated as national economic priorities. Source: Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals · National Mutual Economy Report 2025 · 2025 []
- Less than 0.1% of Australian housingHousing co-operatives remain a tiny share of Australia’s homes despite offering a long-established non-speculative housing model. Source: National Housing Supply and Affordability Council · State of the Housing System 2025 · 2025 []
- 342 Italian worker buyouts, involving 10,000+ workersWith a dedicated legal and finance framework, workers can sometimes save viable firms and jobs rather than see them sold off or shut down. Source: fi-compass / European Commission · ESF+ Study on Workers’ Buyout Italy · 2024 []
Part 01
The Case for Change
Why Co-operatives & Community Ownership matters
Ownership Is Economic Power
Give Australians practical ways to own the work, assets and services they rely on.
Australia does not lack enterprise. It lacks enough ways for ordinary people to hold a meaningful stake in enterprise. Co-operatives and community-owned organisations give workers, customers, producers and residents a route to own and govern economic assets collectively: a business, a local service, a housing provider, an energy asset or a financial institution. Their purpose is not to abolish private enterprise. It is to ensure that private ownership by distant investors is not the only option when a business needs capital, an owner retires, a community asset is threatened, or local people want to build something together.
Australia’s existing co-operative and mutual sector shows that this is not speculative policy. The 2025 National Mutual Economy report identified at least 1,834 active co-operatives and mutuals, including 1,463 co-operatives, 306 mutual enterprises, 39 friendly societies and 26 member-owned superannuation funds. Together they recorded more than 37.3 million active memberships, annual turnover above $184.4 billion and direct employment of at least 94,421 people. These memberships overlap – one person may belong to several organisations – so they should not be treated as a population count. But the data demonstrate that member ownership is already embedded in Australian life.1
The gap is between existing success and public policy support. Australia’s conventional company model benefits from well-developed legal, financial and advisory systems. By contrast, a group of employees seeking to buy a viable small business, residents seeking to acquire a local service, or a regional community developing shared energy infrastructure faces more complicated legal advice, limited patient capital and inconsistent grant eligibility. Co-operatives are regulated under state and territory law, while mutuals sit under Commonwealth corporations law; the Senate inquiry found that this split, weak data and limited professional familiarity created avoidable barriers.2
Community ownership is especially valuable where conventional markets fail to value continuity, local access or social benefit. A corporate buyer may rationally close a small regional facility, sell a local pub, consolidate a service or relocate production. For the workers and residents affected, those decisions can mean lost employment, reduced services, weakened local supply chains and less social connection. A worker buyout or community acquisition will not always be commercially viable – and public policy must not prop up failing enterprises indefinitely – but communities should be able to assess, finance and pursue viable alternatives.
Housing offers a stark illustration. The National Housing Supply and Affordability Council reports that housing co-operatives provide less than 0.1% of Australia’s housing stock.3 The BCCM counted 5,804 co-operative households in 2024, while Australia’s housing affordability crisis operates on a vastly larger scale.4 A co-operative housing strategy cannot replace public housing investment, tenancy protections, planning reform or direct social-housing delivery. It can, however, add permanently affordable, resident-governed and non-speculative homes to the mix.
The same principle applies to the energy transition. Commonwealth funding has supported up to 370 community batteries under ARENA’s first funding round, with up to $143 million conditionally approved.5 But a battery located in a community is not automatically owned by that community. WeRise would make shared ownership, local benefit agreements and democratic governance core criteria wherever public money supports locally situated assets.
A stronger co-operative and community ownership sector would diversify Australia’s economy: more resilient local enterprises, more routes to business succession, broader wealth ownership and stronger local capacity. This is a reform about freedom – the freedom to build, own and decide together.
Part 02
Evidence and Experience
Co-operatives & Community Ownership: what other countries show
Collective Ownership Works When It Is Enabled
Italy · United Kingdom · Scotland · European Union
International evidence does not provide a single template for Australia. Ownership models reflect national company law, tax systems, labour markets, finance institutions and co-operative traditions. But several comparable programs demonstrate the importance of enabling law, specialised finance and long-term technical support. Italy shows how worker buyouts can preserve employment through structured public and co-operative finance.
The United Kingdom demonstrates the rapid growth of employee ownership trusts after a tax-supported business-transfer framework was introduced. Scotland provides evidence of an active regional employee-ownership ecosystem. The UK Community Ownership Fund shows both the demand for locally owned assets and the limits of early outcome measurement. Together, these cases support a practical Australian approach: give communities and workers credible ownership pathways, while maintaining commercial discipline, independent appraisal and transparent evaluation.
Italy · 1985–present; major reform period from 2003
Marcora Law worker-buyout framework. Workers facing firm closure or insolvency may form a co-operative to acquire and relaunch the enterprise, using their severance/unemployment-related entitlements as member capital alongside specialised finance and support, including revolving-fund mechanisms. 342 mapped worker-buyout operations involving more than 10,000 employees.
- 342 worker-buyout operations have been mapped since the 1985 framework was introduced. []
- These buyouts involved more than 10,000 workers. []
- Approximately 38% were still active at the time of the cited study, employing around 4,000 workers. []
- The average lifespan of mapped operations was 18 years. []
- Earlier data indicate substantially higher survival for post-2003 buyouts than the historical aggregate, but definitions and observation periods differ and should not be directly compared without review. []
Italy’s model is not a blank cheque to rescue every failing business. Its lesson is that workers need a legally recognised pathway, specialist due diligence, patient capital and technical support before they can realistically bid for viable firms. Australia should pilot a worker-buyout service focused on viable SMEs at succession, insolvency or planned closure.
United Kingdom · 2014–2025
Employee Ownership Trusts (EOTs). A qualifying trust acquires and holds a controlling interest in a company for the benefit of all eligible employees. The 2014 framework introduced capital gains tax relief for qualifying owners selling a controlling interest to an EOT, subject to statutory conditions. Approximately 2,470 UK employee-owned businesses and more than 358,000 employee owners by 2025, according to Employee Ownership Association-supported sector data.
- Approximately 2,470 employee-owned businesses were reported in the United Kingdom by 2025. []
- The sector reported more than 358,000 employee owners. []
- More than 500 businesses transitioned to employee ownership in 2024. []
- Companies House-based analysis identified 2,223 EOT groups, although employee estimates vary by method and coverage. []
- The UK Government defines an EOT as a structure in which a company is indirectly owned by employees through a trust that controls the company for their benefit. []
An Australian employee-ownership trust should be designed for genuine broad-based employee benefit, not merely tax planning. It could complement worker co-operatives by offering another collective succession pathway for small and medium enterprises, subject to employee voice, fair valuation and anti-avoidance rules.
Scotland · 2014–2024
Employee ownership ecosystem centred on employee ownership trusts, direct employee ownership and advisory support. Scotland has supported awareness, business-transition advice and market development through institutions including Scottish Enterprise. 177 Scottish-registered employee-owned businesses recorded in the 2024 census.
- The 2024 Scottish census recorded 177 Scottish-registered employee-owned businesses. []
- 99% of surveyed employee-owned businesses used a trust structure. []
- 85% relied solely on an employee trust rather than combining trust and direct ownership. []
- 15% reported some form of direct individual employee ownership. []
- The evidence demonstrates that trust-based collective ownership can become a mainstream business-succession model when advisory and institutional support are available. []
A national policy should not assume every worker-owned enterprise must use a traditional co-operative legal form. Australia should support several democratic ownership structures – worker co-operatives, employee ownership trusts and hybrid social enterprises – while requiring meaningful employee participation and benefit-sharing.
United Kingdom · July 2021–January 2025
Community Ownership Fund. A £150 million fund supporting the purchase or renovation of community assets across the United Kingdom, including facilities such as pubs, community centres, sporting assets and heritage buildings. Four funding rounds; interim evaluation based on data gathered between March 2024 and March 2025 and 11 case studies.
- The fund’s total budget was £150 million. []
- It launched in July 2021 and closed after four funding rounds on 6 January 2025. []
- The interim evaluation drew on 11 case studies. []
- Case-study survey estimates of monthly willingness to pay ranged from £1.04 to £3.69 per respondent for selected assets. []
- The interim evaluation concluded that land-value uplifts could not be quantified or monetised from available evidence. []
A community-assets fund could protect locally valuable facilities, but it must not overclaim easily measurable economic returns. Australia should build in rigorous baseline data, independent evaluation, feasibility support and long-term operating plans – because buying an asset is only the first step in sustaining it.
Part 03
Costs and Trade-offs
The cost of Co-operatives & Community Ownership
Build Capacity, Not Permanent Dependence
The public cost is start-up capital and capability; the public return is stronger local ownership, retained services and viable jobs.
This policy should be funded as an enabling investment, not treated as an open-ended subsidy for any enterprise that adopts a co-operative label. The gross cost would include a national advisory service, feasibility grants, legal conversion support, a revolving finance facility, community-asset acquisition grants and independent evaluation. The net cost would depend on repayment rates, co-investment, employment retained, tax receipts, avoided service loss and the value of community assets preserved. Those outcomes are real but cannot be confidently monetised nationally without a program design, pilot cohort and longitudinal evaluation.
For that reason, WeRise should not present a fabricated national net-cost figure. The recommended approach is a five-year, independently evaluated pilot with capped Commonwealth expenditure and state, territory, philanthropic, superannuation and local co-investment. International experience supports this caution. The UK Community Ownership Fund had a £150 million gross allocation, but its interim evaluation concluded that land-value uplifts could not yet be quantified or monetised. [] Italy’s worker-buyout evidence shows meaningful job retention potential, but historical survival rates vary depending on the period and cohort measured. []
The policy’s fiscal discipline should come from three principles: only finance commercially or operationally viable plans; use concessional and recoverable finance where possible rather than grants alone; and publish program-level outcomes, defaults, jobs retained, member participation and community benefits. This is how public money supports ownership without disguising failure or privatising gains.
| Item | Amount | Note |
|---|---|---|
| National Co-operative and Community Ownership Office – advice, templates, accreditation and data collection | -$10 million per year [] | Illustrative administration and capability allocation; requires formal costing and program design. |
| Feasibility, legal and governance grants for worker buyouts and community asset acquisition | -$20 million per year [] | Small grants would fund independent valuation, business planning, legal advice and member training before larger finance is committed. |
| Revolving Co-operative Transition and Community Asset Facility | -$50 million per year capitalisation [] | Patient loans, guarantees and matched finance; repayments would recycle capital, so gross appropriation is not equivalent to net long-run cost. |
| Community ownership equity and asset-acquisition grants | -$25 million per year [] | Competitive co-investment for essential local assets where grants are justified by public benefit and affordability outcomes. |
| State, local, philanthropic and member co-investment | To be determined [] | Design should require matched contributions proportionate to project type and community capacity, with safeguards for low-income and remote communities. |
| Loan repayments and recycled capital | To be determined [] | Dependent on portfolio performance; should be reported annually rather than assumed in advance. |
| Avoided unemployment, retained local services and tax revenue | Not reliably quantifiable before pilot evaluation [] | Outcomes may be material but should not be pre-booked as savings without a robust counterfactual. |
| Net cost estimate | Not yet costable to policy-grade standard [] | Commission Parliamentary Budget Office costing after finalising eligibility, lending terms, grant ratios, tax treatment and Commonwealth–state shares. |
The strongest objections to Co-operatives & Community Ownership
The strongest criticism is that co-operatives and community enterprises can be undercapitalised, slow to make decisions and vulnerable to governance conflict.
This is a genuine risk. Democratic membership does not automatically provide the management expertise, cash flow, technical capacity or commercial discipline needed to run an enterprise. A worker group can be deeply committed to saving a workplace and still inherit an unviable business, outdated equipment, excessive debt or a collapsing market. The policy response must therefore include independent viability tests, professional advice, phased finance and the ability to decline support where the evidence does not support a sustainable plan. Good intentions are not a business model.
A second criticism is that public money should not subsidise particular ownership forms.
There is force in this objection if the policy amounts to unconditional grants for projects because they use co-operative language. But the existing economy is not ownership-neutral: tax settings, corporate law, financial institutions, procurement practices and advisory markets already favour conventional investor-owned firms. A modest public framework would correct an access problem by ensuring collective ownership can compete fairly. Support should be available based on public benefit, viability and accountability – not ideology – and should include recoverable finance where appropriate.
Third, critics may argue that worker buyouts leave workers dangerously exposed: they can lose both their jobs and their invested savings if the enterprise fails.
This risk is real and should be explicitly disclosed. Australia should not copy any overseas mechanism that permits workers to gamble essential retirement savings or severance entitlements without safeguards. Participation must be voluntary; personal exposure should be capped; members must receive independent financial and legal advice; and public support must not pressure workers into purchasing an enterprise to avoid politically inconvenient job losses.
Fourth, community ownership can reproduce inequality if affluent communities are better able to raise capital, organise volunteers and navigate grant processes.
A pub acquisition campaign in a wealthy town may be far easier than retaining services in a low-income outer suburb, remote community or disaster-affected region. A fair program must therefore provide higher technical assistance and lower co-contribution requirements where community wealth is limited, while ensuring that funding does not displace public provision of essential services. Community ownership should add voice and control, not make basic services dependent on local fundraising capacity.
Fifth, evidence on broad social and economic effects is incomplete.
The UK Community Ownership Fund’s interim evaluation found it could not quantify or monetise land-value uplifts. International survival statistics are sensitive to selection bias, sector composition and the point from which survival is measured. Italy’s worker-buyout data are promising but cannot prove that every supported buyout would otherwise have failed, or that outcomes transfer directly to Australia. The correct claim is not that co-operatives are universally superior. It is that they are an underused ownership option with credible evidence, established Australian practice and a strong case for carefully evaluated expansion.
Part 04
The Australian Design
How Co-operatives & Community Ownership would work in Australia
Make Collective Ownership a Real Option
A national framework for worker buyouts, community assets, co-operative housing and locally owned infrastructure.
WeRise would establish a National Co-operative and Community Ownership Strategy, led by the Commonwealth in partnership with states, territories, First Nations organisations, local government, co-operative peak bodies, unions, community-housing providers and social-finance institutions. Its purpose would be simple: when Australians want to own something together, the law, finance and public programs should help them do it responsibly.
The first priority is a Co-operative and Community Ownership Office within the Commonwealth economic portfolio. The office would maintain national data; publish model rules, governance standards and procurement guidance; operate a specialist advice line; fund feasibility studies; and build professional capability among accountants, lawyers, business advisers and local governments. This responds directly to the Senate inquiry’s findings on data, awareness, grants and professional knowledge.1 Existing legal forms would remain available, but the Commonwealth would work with states and territories to improve nationally consistent co-operative regulation and remove unnecessary barriers to cross-border activity.2
Second, WeRise would create a Worker Buyout and Employee Ownership Pathway. When a viable small or medium business is proposed for closure or sale, employees should be able to request information sufficient to develop a credible collective bid, subject to confidentiality and commercial safeguards. The program would fund independent valuations and business plans, then offer patient loans, guarantees and matched finance through a revolving facility. Workers would not be forced to buy failing enterprises; participation would be voluntary and support would depend on rigorous viability assessment. The model could include worker co-operatives and appropriately regulated employee ownership trusts, with requirements for broad employee benefit and democratic voice.
Third, WeRise would establish a Community Assets Fund for facilities with demonstrated public value: community halls, local food infrastructure, disability and aged-care social enterprises, regional services, cultural venues, renewable-energy assets and threatened local amenities. Grants would be competitive, co-funded and conditional on a long-term operating plan, affordability commitments and transparent local governance. Funding should privilege genuine community equity, voting rights and benefit-sharing – not merely consultation.
Fourth, the strategy would expand co-operative housing as one part of a broader housing agenda. The National Housing Supply and Affordability Council reports that less than 0.1% of Australian housing is co-operative.3 WeRise would partner with community-housing providers, state housing agencies and local councils to pilot common-equity rental and limited-equity ownership co-operatives on public or inclusionary-zoning land. These projects must complement – not displace – direct investment in public and social housing.
Finally, public energy funding should include a community-ownership test. The Commonwealth has already allocated $171 million through ARENA’s community-battery initiative, while Round 1 conditionally approved up to $143 million for up to 370 batteries.4 WeRise would require funded projects to disclose ownership, governance, local revenue sharing and consumer benefits, and create a dedicated stream for genuine community-owned energy infrastructure.
A realistic timeline is two years for legislation, national standards and pilots; three to five years for the revolving finance facility and first community-asset projects to mature; and five years for independent evaluation before broader scaling.
Part 05
People and Transition
Who Co-operatives & Community Ownership affects
More People With a Stake
Workers, renters, regional communities and service users should have more than a spectator’s role in the economy.
The people most likely to benefit are those who create value but have the least control over it: workers in businesses facing sale or closure, renters shut out of secure housing, regional producers dependent on concentrated supply chains, consumers with limited local services, and communities hosting infrastructure without a share in its ownership or returns. Co-operative and community ownership does not guarantee wealth or eliminate risk. It changes who gets to make decisions and who can benefit when an enterprise succeeds.
Workers are central. Australia’s co-operative and mutual sector already directly employs at least 94,421 people, according to the 2025 National Mutual Economy report. [] That shows the model can operate at meaningful scale, but it remains inaccessible to many employees when a conventional employer is sold or closed. A worker-buyout pathway would give employees time, advice and finance to assess whether collective ownership is viable rather than treating job loss as the only possible outcome.
Case study
A family-owned regional engineering business has 24 skilled employees. The owner plans to retire and receives an offer from a metropolitan competitor that may relocate the work. Under the WeRise model, employees could access confidential business-transition advice, an independent valuation and feasibility grant. If the business is viable, a worker co-operative or employee trust could make a properly financed bid. If it is not viable, the assessment protects workers from taking on an unsustainable business. The policy creates an option, not an obligation.
Renters and lower-income households would benefit from a larger pool of permanently affordable, resident-governed homes. Yet the starting point is extremely small: the National Housing Supply and Affordability Council reports that less than 0.1% of Australian housing is delivered by housing co-operatives. [] BCCM mapping identified 5,804 co-operative households nationally in 2024. [] Community ownership cannot substitute for public housing or rent protections, but it can provide stable, non-speculative homes where residents have genuine participation in management and maintenance.
Case study
A group of renters in an inner- or middle-ring suburb face the sale of their ageing apartment building. Rather than competing individually in a property market they cannot afford, a community-housing provider and resident co-operative could partner to acquire and refurbish the building under a common-equity model. Residents would pay an income-linked or below-market rent structure, participate in governance and have secure tenure, while a regulated provider protects the asset’s long-term affordability.
First Nations communities should be partners, not an afterthought. Collective governance and community-controlled organisations have deep relevance, but policy must respect Indigenous data sovereignty, land rights, cultural authority and self-determination. No generic co-operative program should be imposed over First Nations-led economic development.
Opposition may come from some business groups concerned about compliance, lenders concerned about credit risk, property interests resistant to non-speculative housing, and governments wary of grant misuse. These are legitimate implementation concerns. The response is strict project appraisal, transparent governance, co-investment, independent evaluation and no claim that community ownership suits every asset or enterprise.
Part 06
Related policies
Co-operatives & Community Ownership sits within a wider set of WeRise policies.
- Economy & Work: more WeRise policies in this pillar
- WeRise: all 29 policies across seven pillars
Notes
Sources and Supporting Documents
- Australian Parliament Senate Economics References Committee. Cooperative, Mutual and Member-owned Firms. Parliament of Australia. 2016. aph.gov.au
- Australian Treasury. FOI 2064 – Material Relating to the Senate Economics References Committee Inquiry into Co-operative, Mutual and Member-owned Firms. Australian Government. 2019. treasury.gov.au
- National Housing Supply and Affordability Council. State of the Housing System 2025. Australian Government. 2025. nhsac.gov.au
- Australian Renewable Energy Agency. ARENA Funds National Community Battery Roll-Out. Australian Government. 2024. arena.gov.au
- Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water. Community Batteries for Household Solar Program. Australian Government. 2026. dcceew.gov.au
- UK Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. Evaluation of the Community Ownership Fund: Feasibility Study Report. Government of the United Kingdom. 2025. gov.uk
- UK Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. Community Ownership Fund Evaluation: Interim Report. Government of the United Kingdom. 2026. gov.uk
- UK Department for Business and Trade. Evaluation of Employee Ownership Trusts. Government of the United Kingdom. 2025. gov.uk
- European Commission / fi-compass. ESF+ Study on Workers’ Buyout: Italy. European Union. 2024. fi-compass.eu
- European Parliament. Resolution of 6 July 2022 on the EU Action Plan for the Social Economy. European Union. 2022. eur-lex.europa.eu
- Mazzarol, Tim. Australia’s Leading Co-operative and Mutual Enterprises in 2025. Centre for Entrepreneurial Research and Innovation, University of Western Australia. 2025. ceru.au
- Scottish Enterprise. Employee-Owned Business Census 2024. Scottish Enterprise. 2024. scottish-enterprise.com
- Social Enterprise Australia. The Size and Economic Contribution of Social Enterprise in Australia. 2023. snowfoundation.org.au
- International Co-operative Alliance / CICOPA. Cooperatives and Employment: A Global Report. 2014. ica.coop
- Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals. 2025 National Mutual Economy Report. BCCM. 2025. bccm.coop
- Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals. Australia’s Housing Co-operative Sector: 2024 Data. BCCM. 2024. bccm.coop
- Employee Ownership Association. EO Research & Insights. Employee Ownership Association. 2025. employeeownership.co.uk
- Employee Ownership Strategy. The State of UK Employee Ownership. 2025. employeeownershipstrategy.co.uk
- Legacoop Area Studi. Brief Note: Workers’ Buyouts. Legacoop. 2021. areastudi.legacoop.coop
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