WeRise · Policy platform
Electoral & Democratic Reform
Key findings
- 97.7%Turnout at the 2022 federal election shows compulsory voting gives Australia one of the world’s most inclusive electoral systems, but participation alone does not guarantee equal influence. Source: Australian Electoral Commission · 2022 Federal Election Results · 2022
- 32.6%The Coalition won 32.6% of first-preference House votes in 2022 but 58 of 151 seats, illustrating how single-member electorates translate votes into parliamentary power unevenly. Source: Australian Electoral Commission · 2022 House of Representatives First Preferences and Seat Results · 2022
- $6,600The Commonwealth disclosure threshold for the 2024–25 financial year meant political donations below this amount did not have to be disclosed under the previous federal system. Source: Australian Electoral Commission · Disclosure Thresholds · 2024–25
- 99 recommendationsIreland’s Citizens’ Assembly on Gender Equality made 45 recommendations and demonstrated how a representative public body can deliberate beyond party campaign cycles. Source: Citizens’ Assembly of Ireland · Report on Gender Equality · 2021
Part 01
The Case for Change
Why Electoral & Democratic Reform matters
Equal Voice Is Democratic Infrastructure
Australia protects the ballot well; it must now protect the conditions under which the ballot is meaningful.
Australia should be proud of compulsory voting, independent electoral administration and a peaceful tradition of transfers of power. At the 2022 federal election, 97.7% of enrolled voters cast a vote.1 That achievement matters: it means elections are shaped by almost the whole adult electorate rather than by the most affluent, ideological or organised minority.
But a high turnout rate is only one measure of democratic health. A citizen who votes has not necessarily had the same opportunity to influence public debate as a corporation with a lobbying team, a wealthy donor, a major media platform or an established party with decades of organisational infrastructure. Democratic reform is therefore not about disparaging elections. It is about making the period before, during and after elections fairer, more transparent and more accountable.
The House of Representatives is elected through single-member preferential districts. That system gives voters the ability to rank candidates and helps ensure local members secure a majority after preferences. It also produces gaps between nationwide vote shares and seats. In 2022 the Coalition received 32.6% of House first preferences and won 58 seats; Labor received 32.6% and won 77 seats.1 Those results are not evidence of fraud or illegitimacy.
They are an ordinary consequence of a system designed around local electorates rather than proportional national outcomes. The question for reform is whether Australia should retain this design unchanged, introduce a proportional element, or at minimum establish an independent, public review of representational fairness.
Political money is the next pressure point. Under the pre-reform federal disclosure settings, the threshold for 2024–25 was $6,600, and annual returns were published after the fact.4 Delayed, high-threshold disclosure makes it difficult for voters to know who is financing political activity while they are deciding how to vote. The Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Political Donations and Other Measures) Act 2024 creates a new framework with lower disclosure thresholds, more frequent reporting, donation and expenditure caps, and public funding. These changes should be implemented transparently and independently evaluated, not treated as the end of the problem.6
WeRise should support an electoral system in which political participation is easy, political finance is visible, electoral boundaries are independent, and no party writes rules solely for its own advantage. It should also create structured opportunities for citizens to deliberate on questions that outlast a news cycle: constitutional reform, climate transition, long-term infrastructure, intergenerational fairness and emerging technology.
Citizens’ assemblies are not a substitute parliament. Properly used, they are a complement to it: randomly selected, demographically representative citizens receive balanced evidence, hear competing views and publish recommendations that elected representatives must formally answer. Ireland’s assemblies show the model’s potential when it has a defined remit, independent facilitation and a pathway to parliamentary consideration.7
The People’s Covenant is a practical democratic bargain: every adult can participate; every political dollar is visible; every major policy claim can be scrutinised; every institution is subject to integrity rules; and every government remains answerable not only at the ballot box, but throughout its term.
Part 02
Evidence and Experience
Electoral & Democratic Reform: what other countries show
Democracy Works Better When People Can See and Shape Power
New Zealand · Ireland · France · Canada
No country has solved democratic representation, political money and public trust once and for all. The best international evidence instead offers usable institutional lessons. New Zealand shows how proportional representation can make parliamentary outcomes more proportional while retaining local members. Ireland shows how citizens’ assemblies can give complex moral and constitutional questions a deliberative pathway.
France illustrates both the promise and limitation of large-scale climate deliberation: citizens can develop detailed proposals, but governments must be clear about what happens next. Canada provides a practical example of independent electoral administration and citizen assemblies at the provincial level. For Australia, the transferable principle is not to import another country’s constitution; it is to build institutions that distribute political voice, make power visible and establish clear accountability for whether public participation changes decisions.
New Zealand · Mixed-Member Proportional system used since 1996
Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) elections. Voters cast one party vote and one electorate vote; Parliament is normally 120 seats, with party seats allocated proportionally subject to the threshold rules. National Parliament; MMP has been used in 10 general elections from 1996 to 2023.
- New Zealand’s Electoral Commission describes MMP as combining local electorate representation with proportional party representation.
- A party normally needs at least 5% of party votes or an electorate seat to qualify for proportional seats.
- The 2023 general election returned 123 MPs because of overhang and related allocation effects; the system’s base size remains 120 seats.
- The 2012 referendum review found 57.8% of valid votes supported retaining MMP.
- MMP has increased the likelihood that Parliament’s party composition broadly reflects party-vote shares, while coalition or support agreements have become normal features of government formation.
Australia could assess a mixed-member model or a proportional top-up for the House without abandoning geographic representation. Any change should be developed by an independent commission, tested through public consultation and ideally put to a referendum or plebiscite only after voters receive a clear, non-partisan model.
Ireland · 2016–2018 (Citizens’ Assembly); 2019–2021 (Gender Equality Assembly)
Deliberative citizens’ assemblies of randomly selected, broadly representative members, chaired independently and supported by expert evidence, submissions and facilitated deliberation. The 2016 Citizens’ Assembly had 99 citizen members plus an independent chair; the Gender Equality Assembly also had 99 citizen members plus chair.
- The 2016 Citizens’ Assembly comprised 99 randomly selected citizens designed to be broadly representative of Irish society.
- Its work included constitutional and policy questions; its recommendations were submitted to the Oireachtas for consideration.
- The Gender Equality Assembly issued 45 recommendations across care, work, leadership, pay, violence and constitutional change.
- Published processes included expert presentations, public submissions and accessible documentation, allowing deliberation to be scrutinised rather than treated as a black box.
- The model’s impact depended on a formal political response; deliberation creates legitimacy but does not itself enact law.
A standing Australian Citizens’ Assembly Office could convene assemblies on defined national questions and require the Commonwealth Parliament to debate and publish a response to every recommendation. The safeguard is not that elected representatives must accept every proposal, but that they cannot quietly ignore an informed public process.
France · 2019–2020
Citizens’ Convention for Climate, a deliberative body of 150 randomly selected citizens tasked with proposing measures to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by at least 40% from 1990 levels by 2030 in a spirit of social justice. 150 citizens selected by lot; nine months of work, seven thematic groups and 149 proposals.
- The Convention involved 150 citizens selected by lot to reflect French social diversity.
- Its mandate was to propose measures for at least a 40% emissions reduction by 2030 compared with 1990, in a spirit of social justice.
- It produced 149 proposals.
- Citizens heard from experts, stakeholders and facilitators, demonstrating the scale at which informed public deliberation can operate.
- Subsequent implementation was partial and contested, underscoring the need for a clear government response mechanism and transparent tracking of each recommendation.
A national assembly could be particularly useful for long-duration transition questions such as climate adaptation, energy infrastructure, AI governance or tax reform. France’s lesson is that a government must state in advance how recommendations will be assessed, legislated, funded or rejected.
British Columbia, Canada · 2004–2005
Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, established by the provincial legislature to assess the electoral system and recommend whether it should be changed. 160 members: one woman and one man selected from each of 79 electoral districts, plus two Indigenous members and a chair.
- The Assembly comprised 160 members selected through a civic lottery process.
- Members undertook a learning phase, public-hearing phase and deliberation phase before recommending BC-STV.
- The 2005 referendum achieved 57.7% support, below the province’s then-required 60% threshold.
- The 2009 referendum recorded 39.1% support after a further public campaign.
- The process demonstrated that electoral-system reform requires extensive public education and neutral information, not only a technically strong proposal.
Electoral reform needs a serious civic-education program and a transparent commission process. A citizens’ assembly can improve legitimacy, but it cannot overcome unclear ballot questions, weak public information or excessively high approval thresholds by itself.
Part 03
Costs and Trade-offs
The cost of Electoral & Democratic Reform
Democracy Has a Price; Capture Has a Bigger One
Cost transparent institutions properly, rather than pretending weak institutions are free.
A responsible democratic-reform program should not invent a single net-cost number before its design is settled. The package includes low-cost legislative reforms – faster disclosure, lobbying transparency, political-advertising rules, parliamentary response requirements and integrity safeguards – as well as recurring administrative costs for enforcement, public education, data systems and citizens’ assemblies. Electoral-system change could have additional one-off costs for redistributions, ballot design, voter education, software, counting and training. Those costs are real, but they are not comparable to a conventional transfer program because their purpose is to protect the legitimacy and accountability of every future budget decision.
The Commonwealth’s 2024 political-finance changes create financial impacts through administrative arrangements and public funding, but the final cost to a WeRise program depends on choices not yet made: the disclosure threshold, reporting frequency, enforcement staffing, public-funding formula, cap levels and whether independent candidates and new entrants are treated fairly.6 A national citizens’ assembly program should similarly be costed only after a model is defined: assembly size, sitting days, participant support, accessibility, expert evidence, translation, regional participation and secretariat functions.
Gross cost therefore means direct Commonwealth expenditure. Net cost must account for any savings from consolidating duplicative consultation, more efficient public engagement, reduced election-administration complexity where applicable, and avoided costs from corruption, undisclosed influence or policy failure. The latter benefits are real but should not be assigned speculative dollar values without independent modelling. WeRise should seek Parliamentary Budget Office costing before adopting a final fiscal commitment.
| Item | Amount | Note |
|---|---|---|
| National democratic-reform commission and legislative program | To be costed | Independent statutory review, consultation, drafting and implementation planning; scale depends on final terms of reference. |
| Real-time political-finance disclosure and searchable public database | To be costed | Commonwealth administrative, audit, enforcement and digital-system costs; reforms can build on AEC disclosure infrastructure. |
| Standing citizens’ assembly capability | To be costed | Includes civic lottery, participant support, independent facilitation, expert evidence, accessibility and published government responses. |
| Electoral-system change public education and implementation | To be costed | One-off cost only if a change is approved; includes ballot design, voter education, AEC systems and training. |
| Consolidated public consultation and deliberation capacity | Unquantified | Potential administrative efficiency where assemblies replace duplicated or low-quality consultation; requires independent evaluation. |
| Avoided costs from stronger integrity and more transparent political influence | Not reliably monetisable | Benefits may include better procurement, policy design and confidence, but no defensible aggregate saving is claimed without modelling. |
| Net cost estimate | Not policy-grade costable until final model is specified | Obtain a Parliamentary Budget Office costing and implementation plan before Active Position status. |
The strongest objections to Electoral & Democratic Reform
The strongest objection is that electoral reform can create instability.
Majoritarian systems can generate clear governments and local accountability; proportional systems may increase the number of parties, make coalition negotiation more frequent and give small parties leverage beyond their vote share. This is a real trade-off. A WeRise position should not promise that proportionality delivers frictionless government. The response is to assess concrete design choices – thresholds, electorate size, local-member guarantees and confidence-and-supply rules – rather than treating all proportional systems as the same. New Zealand’s MMP experience demonstrates that proportional representation can operate stably, but it does not mechanically determine Australian outcomes.8
A second objection is that spending and donation caps restrict political speech.
Money can fund communication, and regulation can burden challengers as well as incumbents. That risk is serious, especially where compliance rules are complex or public funding favours parties with prior electoral success. The response is not unlimited money. It is rules designed around political equality: low-friction compliance for small participants, transparent exemptions or thresholds for genuine grassroots activity, accessible public information and regular independent reviews of whether caps entrench existing power.
A third objection is that truth-in-political-advertising rules create censorship.
Governments should not decide which political opinions are acceptable, and contested claims about future policy cannot be adjudicated as simple facts. Any rules must therefore be narrow: focused on demonstrably false factual representations, administered independently, subject to review, and protective of opinion, satire, prediction and vigorous debate. A political-advertising library and targeting disclosure are less speech-restrictive tools that should be implemented regardless.
A fourth objection is that citizens’ assemblies are unelected and can be manipulated by whoever chooses the question, evidence and facilitators.
That danger exists. The answer is transparent selection through a civic lottery, independent oversight, published evidence and submissions, clear conflict rules, participant support, public proceedings where appropriate and a requirement that governments publish their response. Assemblies should advise; elected parliaments should remain accountable for final lawmaking.
A fifth objection is that Australians already have elections, courts, parliamentary committees, consultation processes and integrity agencies.
Adding institutions could duplicate work. In some areas that is correct: reform should strengthen and coordinate existing institutions rather than create permanent bureaucracy without purpose. But existing mechanisms do not solve delayed donation disclosure, opaque digital advertising, unequal lobbying access or the absence of structured public deliberation on long-term issues. The test should be functional: retain what works, publish performance measures, and abolish or redesign anything that does not improve democratic equality or accountability.
Part 04
The Australian Design
How Electoral & Democratic Reform would work in Australia
A Democratic Renewal Act
Fair rules, visible money and a real role for citizens between elections.
WeRise would pursue a staged Democratic Renewal Act and associated institutional package. The Commonwealth should lead because federal electoral law, political finance, corporations, communications, national integrity settings and much lobbying regulation sit primarily within federal power. States and territories remain essential partners: they administer their own elections and maintain separate donation, disclosure, lobbying, local-government and integrity systems. The national objective is not to erase state autonomy but to establish minimum democratic standards and interoperable public information.1,4
First, political finance should be visible quickly enough to matter. The new federal regime should be independently reviewed before and after commencement against five tests: whether disclosure is timely and searchable; whether donation and expenditure caps are enforceable; whether associated entities and third parties are captured; whether public funding rewards genuine participation rather than incumbency; and whether compliance costs are proportionate for independents and small parties. AEC enforcement should be properly resourced, and the public should be able to search political donations, expenditure and significant campaign advertising in one plain-language database.4,6
Second, establish a national framework for truthful and transparent political communication. This should include prominent authorisation, a public advertising library, disclosure of targeting and funding for digital political advertising, clear correction processes administered independently, and carefully drafted rules against demonstrably false statements of fact likely to affect an electoral choice. Opinion, satire, contestable forecasts and legitimate political argument must remain protected. The objective is transparency and accountability – not a government ministry of truth.
Third, create an independent Australian Democratic Renewal Commission to examine representational fairness, electoral participation, party governance, campaign finance and the future design of the House of Representatives. It should report publicly within two years, use citizens’ panels and constitutional advice, and recommend options rather than a preordained outcome. One option should be a mixed-member proportional or proportional top-up model that retains locally elected members. Any fundamental electoral-system change should proceed only through a transparent public process, detailed voter education and an explicit parliamentary mandate.
Fourth, establish a permanent Australian Citizens’ Assembly Office, independent of ministers. Parliament or a supermajority parliamentary committee could refer defined long-term questions. Each assembly should be selected through a civic lottery, broadly representative, paid and supported, publicly evidenced and required to receive a formal government response within six months. This gives people a meaningful role between elections while preserving elected Parliament’s authority to legislate.
Implementation should occur over one term: first-year legislative and design work; second-year database, advertising-library and lobbying reforms; years two to three for an initial citizens’ assembly; and a two-year commission review of representation and voting systems. Every reform should be tested for accessibility, First Nations participation, disability inclusion, regional access and fair treatment of new political entrants.
Part 05
People and Transition
Who Electoral & Democratic Reform affects
Every Citizen Has a Stake
Democratic rules decide whose voice is heard before decisions are made.
Every enrolled voter is affected by democratic rules, but the effects are not evenly distributed. Compulsory voting brings most Australians to the ballot box – 97.7% of enrolled voters cast a ballot in 2022 – but people do not enter public debate with equal money, time, organisational support, media access or confidence.1 Young people, renters, people in insecure work, regional residents, First Nations communities, migrants, people with disability and communities speaking languages other than English can face practical and institutional barriers to participation. A serious democratic-reform agenda must make participation accessible rather than assuming formal eligibility equals equal voice.
Case study
A renter in a marginal outer-suburban electorate works casual shifts, moves twice in a year and has little time to attend party meetings or formal consultations. They vote, but political advertising reaches them through opaque online targeting and they cannot easily see who paid for it. A public political-ad library, timely disclosure, accessible enrolment and deliberative opportunities would not tell them how to vote. They would make the system easier to see and use.
Case study
A regional disability advocate has detailed evidence about inaccessible transport but lacks the funds and networks to secure repeated meetings with ministers or to run a professional campaign. A well-designed citizens’ assembly or parliamentary deliberation process can bring people with lived experience into structured policy evidence, with support for travel, access needs, communication and participation. The point is not to replace advocacy; it is to stop access to decision-makers being reserved for those who can afford it.
Independent candidates, minor parties, civil-society organisations, unions, business associations and advocacy groups are also affected. Fair rules should allow them to organise and argue for their views while preventing any side from bypassing disclosure or cap rules through associated entities and shell structures. The strongest objections will come from actors whose existing advantages are reduced: parties wary of new competitors; donors who prefer privacy; lobby firms benefiting from opaque access; and some campaign organisations concerned that regulation will burden grassroots activity. These are genuine design issues, not reasons to leave the system unchanged.
The policy should therefore distinguish between ordinary civic participation and large-scale political influence. Small donations, volunteering, public protest and issue advocacy should remain easy. Large donations, paid campaign infrastructure, professional lobbying and highly targeted political advertising should be transparent, accountable and subject to enforceable limits. That balance protects both free political expression and political equality.
Part 06
Related policies
Electoral & Democratic Reform sits within a wider set of WeRise policies.
- Democracy & Rights: more WeRise policies in this pillar
- WeRise: all 29 policies across seven pillars
Notes
Sources and Supporting Documents
- Australian Electoral Commission. 2022 Federal Election Results and Statistics. 2022. www.aec.gov.au
- Parliament of Australia. Indigenous Australians and the Vote. Parliamentary Library. 2023. www.aph.gov.au
- Australian Electoral Commission. The Senate: Counting Votes and the Transferable Vote System. 2024. www.aec.gov.au
- Australian Electoral Commission. Disclosure Thresholds. 2024–25. www.aec.gov.au
- Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. Report on the Conduct of the 2022 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto. Parliament of Australia. 2023. www.aph.gov.au
- Parliament of Australia. Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Political Donations and Other Measures) Act 2024. Federal Register of Legislation. 2024. www.legislation.gov.au
- Citizens’ Assembly of Ireland. Report on Gender Equality. 2021. www.citizensassembly.ie
- New Zealand Electoral Commission. What Is MMP? 2024. elections.nz
- OECD. Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions. OECD Publishing. 2020. doi.org
- Australian National University, Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance. Deliberative Democracy Research and Practice. 2024. democracy.anu.edu.au
- Grattan Institute. Who’s in the Room? Access and Influence in Australian Politics. 2023. grattan.edu.au
- Transparency International Australia. National Integrity System and Electoral Integrity Resources. 2024. transparency.org.au
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