WeRise · Policy platform
Rail & Public Transport
Key findings
- 90 Mt CO₂-eTransport produced 90 million tonnes of emissions in 2022 – 21% of Australia’s total – and on-road vehicles generated 85% of transport emissions. Source: Climate Change Authority · 2024 Sector Pathways Review: Transport · 2024
- 52.7%More than half of employed Australians drove themselves to work on Census day in 2021, revealing the scale of car dependence – while noting COVID-era work patterns affected that Census measure. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics · 2021 Census, Method of Travel to Work · 2022
- 16.8% higher patronageSouth East Queensland public-transport patronage was 16.8% higher in 2024–25 after 50-cent fares, alongside more than $349 million in customer savings. Source: Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads · Annual Report 2024–25
- $36 billionAustralian governments recorded $36 billion in public rail-related expenditure in 2023–24, making transparent choices about rail networks, service and project value essential. Source: Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics · Australian Infrastructure and Transport Statistics Yearbook 2025
Part 01
The Case for Change
Why Rail & Public Transport matters
Movement Is a Public Good
Build transport around people’s lives – not around compulsory car ownership.
Australia’s transport system has become a quiet test of wealth, geography and physical ability. If a person can afford a car, fuel, registration, insurance and parking – and is able to drive – the system often works. If they cannot, their access to employment, education, care, family and community can narrow sharply. Rail and public transport policy is therefore not a lifestyle add-on. It is economic and social infrastructure.
The climate arithmetic is equally clear. Transport emitted 90 Mt CO₂-e in 2022, equivalent to 21% of Australia’s national emissions; on-road vehicles accounted for 85% of the sector’s emissions.2 Electrifying the vehicle fleet is necessary, but it cannot resolve the congestion, road space, parking, safety and household-cost consequences of a system in which every essential trip requires a private vehicle. Australia needs to make it easier to travel less by car – not through coercion, but through genuinely useful alternatives.
Australia remains structurally car dependent. In the 2021 Census, 52.7% of employed people aged 15 years and over travelled to work as car drivers; 4.6% used public transport.1 The Census occurred amid pandemic disruption and a large increase in working from home, so these figures should not be used to claim a stable “normal” mode share. But they capture a core reality: for millions of people, the private car remains the practical default because the alternative is slow, infrequent, fragmented or absent.
High-capacity rail remains vital where travel demand is dense, but the reform cannot be rail-only. A connected system includes frequent buses and bus rapid transit, safe walking and cycling access to stations, local feeder services, ferries where geography supports them, accessible stops, live information, integrated ticketing and coordinated timetables. Infrastructure Australia identifies frequency, mode integration, journey-planning information and connections between homes, jobs and activity centres as central features of a functioning public-transport network.8
The fiscal issue is not whether Australia can afford public transport. Governments already committed or spent substantial sums: BITRE records $36 billion in public rail-related expenditure in 2023–24.3 The question is whether that money buys the greatest public value. A station without frequent services, housing, safe access or affordable fares cannot deliver its potential. Conversely, a modest bus-priority corridor, accessible station upgrade or fare reform can materially change daily life for thousands of people.
Queensland’s 50-cent fares demonstrate that price matters. The state’s 2024–25 annual report recorded more than 176 million trips in South East Queensland since the policy began, customer savings above $349 million and patronage 16.8% higher than the corresponding previous period.5 The policy does not prove that universal low fares are automatically the best investment in every jurisdiction. It does prove that simple, affordable fares can unlock latent demand – provided governments also fund additional drivers, vehicles, maintenance and service capacity.
WeRise’s case is not for an endless catalogue of prestige projects. It is for a public mobility guarantee: every Australian should have a realistic way to reach essential destinations without being compelled into car ownership. That requires a national role in funding, standards, equity and accountability; state and territory leadership in service delivery; and local-government partnership on streets, stops and land use.10
Part 02
Evidence and Experience
Rail & Public Transport: what other countries show
A Public Network Is a Policy Choice
Germany · Austria · Luxembourg · Queensland, Australia
International experience does not offer a single model to import. Germany shows the potential and fiscal tension of a nationally simple, low-cost ticket across many transport operators. Austria demonstrates how a national annual pass can turn public transport into a comprehensible household service. Luxembourg shows that fare-free travel can increase use but cannot substitute for capacity, network expansion or measures to reduce car traffic. Queensland supplies the closest Australian comparison: a deeply discounted statewide fare, implemented quickly, with measurable patronage and household-savings effects. Together, these cases suggest that fares matter, but they work best when service frequency, accessibility, network integration and stable public operating support are treated as one package.
Germany · Introduced 1 May 2023; €49 per month through 2024, increased to €58 per month from January 2025
Deutschlandticket – monthly subscription providing unlimited travel on local and regional public transport nationwide; excludes long-distance ICE/IC/EC services except where locally accepted National program across Germany’s local and regional public-transport networks
- The 2024 price was €49 per month.
- Evaluation data indicated a median of about 25 trips per month at the €49 price in 2024.
- Research estimates that total public-transport trips rose by 15–25%, combining mode shift and induced trips.
- Research estimates that 15–17% of Deutschlandticket trips were shifted from private cars.
- A German federal research summary estimated approximately €3 billion in annual commuter cost relief in 2024, combining lower public-transport costs and some shift from cars.
A national fare product can reduce complexity across state systems and make public transport feel like a basic service rather than a patchwork of tickets. Australia would need to negotiate durable revenue-sharing arrangements with states and operators before introducing a national pass, and must avoid offering cheaper tickets without investing in service capacity.
Austria · Introduced 26 October 2021; continuing
KlimaTicket Ö – annual nationwide public-transport pass, priced at €1,095 for the standard adult product; discounted annual products included €821 for young people, older people and people with disability in the cited assessment National network covering participating local and regional public-transport services and rail; eligibility and product rules have evolved
- The standard annual pass price was €1,095.
- The cited discounted price for youth, seniors and people with disability was €821.
- The product permits unlimited public-transport use across Austria’s participating national network.
- It provides a one-ticket alternative to separately priced regional passes and fragmented fares.
- Evidence on its long-term causal effect on car kilometres, emissions and distributive outcomes remains incomplete in the source set reviewed for this dossier.
A national annual pass is a plausible long-term goal for Australia’s capital-city and regional systems, but only where governments first agree on interoperability, concession eligibility, revenue distribution and capacity investment. It is more useful as a system-integration model than as proof that a specific fare price will deliver a specific Australian emissions outcome.
Luxembourg · Fare-free public transport introduced 1 March 2020; five-year review published February 2025
Zero fare for standard-class public transport nationwide; first-class rail travel remains excluded Nationwide free public transport across buses, trams and standard-class trains
- Luxembourg became the first country to provide free nationwide public transport on 1 March 2020.
- Rail passenger numbers rose from 25.0 million in 2019 to 31.3 million in 2024.
- Tram patronage rose from 6.2 million in 2019 to 31.7 million in 2024.
- These comparisons cannot attribute all growth to free fares because tram expansion, service changes and the pandemic period also affected patronage.
- A corridor-level empirical study estimated public-transport passenger increases of 12–18%, but did not find a discernible effect on traffic volumes on selected roads.
Fare-free systems are strongest as an equity and simplicity measure where public revenue can sustain them. Luxembourg warns against claiming that free fares alone will reduce congestion: capacity, land use, parking policy and service quality remain decisive. Queensland’s low flat fare may be a more immediately transferable Australian model than full fare abolition.
Queensland, Australia · Trial commenced 5 August 2024; made permanent from February 2025
Flat 50-cent fare per trip on eligible Translink services, including buses, trains, ferries and Gold Coast light rail Statewide Translink fare policy, with reported South East Queensland and regional-urban-bus results
- More than 176 million trips were taken in South East Queensland after introduction, as reported in the 2024–25 annual report.
- Customers saved more than $349 million.
- South East Queensland patronage was 16.8% higher than the comparable previous-year period.
- Regional urban-bus patronage increased by more than 31% across Queensland compared with the previous year.
- The reported 2024–25 patronage was the highest on record.
Queensland provides the strongest current domestic evidence that simple, very low fares can lift demand and reduce household transport costs. The national lesson is conditional: any wider fare reform must include recurrent operating funding for additional services, workers and fleet capacity, and must be evaluated against alternatives such as targeted concessions or frequency improvements.
Part 03
Costs and Trade-offs
The cost of Rail & Public Transport
Cost What We Build – and What We Avoid
Capital works, operating support and fare reform must be assessed as one public balance sheet.
The cost question is real. Rail is capital intensive, construction conditions are difficult and ongoing services require recurring public funding. It is misleading to present new rail, low fares or better bus services as costless. It is equally misleading to assess them only by farebox revenue or the price of concrete. Transport investments change travel times, access to jobs and education, household costs, road congestion, emissions, safety, land values and the need for future road expansion. These effects must be quantified transparently and independently.
Australia already spends heavily on rail. Public rail-related expenditure was $36 billion in 2023–24.3 But cost escalation has undermined public confidence: Infrastructure Australia found average rail-project cost growth of 37% in its reviewed portfolio, more than double the 15% average for road projects.4 The appropriate response is stage-gated funding, independent assurance, published operating-cost forecasts and comparison against lower-cost network options – not an assumption that rail is intrinsically unaffordable.
Queensland’s fare policy demonstrates the fiscal trade-off plainly. The Parliamentary Budget Office estimated the proposal to maintain 50-cent public-transport fares would reduce the Queensland general government sector’s underlying cash balance by $2.6 billion over the forward estimates.11 This is a gross budget impact, not a full social-cost calculation.
It must be considered alongside the more than $349 million reported customer savings, increased use and potential savings from lower fare enforcement and reduced household transport pressure.5 At this stage, a national WeRise package cannot responsibly state a single net cost without corridor-by-corridor capital appraisal, negotiated federal–state operating shares and a defined fare product. The ledger is therefore an evidence-based framing, not a completed national cost model.
| Item | Amount | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Public rail-related expenditure in Australia, 2023–24 | -$36 billion | Recorded public rail-related expenditure; not a measure of one new policy’s cost and includes varied capital and recurrent spending. |
| Average rail-project cost increase in Infrastructure Australia’s monitored portfolio | -37% | Indicates delivery-risk exposure and the need for independent assurance, realistic contingencies and staged commitments. |
| Average road-project cost increase in the same monitored portfolio | -15% | Comparator only; does not mean road investment is automatically higher value. |
| Queensland 50-cent-fares forward-estimate budget impact | -$2.6 billion | Queensland Parliamentary Budget Office estimate of the underlying cash-balance impact over the forward estimates. |
| Customer savings from Queensland 50-cent fares, reported in 2024–25 | +$349 million | Reported customer savings; a household-cost offset, not a direct government revenue return. |
| Estimated benefit from reduced crowding on existing Sydney–Newcastle rail services under one high-speed-rail scenario | +$2.6 billion present value | Infrastructure Australia reported this prospective benefit to 2061; it is a scenario-specific modelled estimate, not an approved-project return. |
| National Connected by Design Compact – net cost estimate | Not yet costed | Requires a published scope, service targets, capital pipeline, fare design, Commonwealth–state funding formula and independent cost–benefit assessment. |
The strongest objections to Rail & Public Transport
The strongest objection is fiscal: rail projects are expensive, frequently overrun, and can displace higher-value investment in hospitals, schools, housing, maintenance or lower-cost bus services.
This concern is well founded. Infrastructure Australia reported average cost growth of 37% across monitored rail projects, and the Inland Rail assurance process reported a P90 estimate at completion of $44.7 billion.4,9 A credible policy cannot wave these risks away. The response is rigorous project selection: publish business cases, test lower-cost alternatives, include full lifecycle and operating costs, use independent assurance, stage projects at decision gates and cancel or redesign projects that do not meet transparent thresholds. “Rail” is not a sufficient justification for a project.
A second objection is that cheap or free fares are a blunt instrument.
They can subsidise people who could afford to pay, reduce operator revenue and fill already crowded peak services without substantially reducing driving. Luxembourg’s experience cautions against treating fare abolition as a congestion cure: research found increased public-transport use along selected corridors but no discernible impact on traffic volumes on the selected roads.13 Queensland’s policy has demonstrably increased patronage, but its full distributional, behavioural and fiscal effects still require independent evaluation.5 The response is to treat fare policy as one lever: retain targeted concessions where they provide greater equity per dollar, but test simple flat fares only when paired with service, capacity and performance measures.
Third, induced demand can undermine the climate case.
If new public-transport trips primarily replace walking, cycling or trips that would not otherwise occur, emissions savings will be smaller than headline patronage growth suggests. Germany’s ticket evidence suggests a mix of car substitution and induced trips rather than a complete shift from driving.14 WeRise should therefore avoid claiming a fixed emissions reduction from any fare policy without Australian before-and-after data. It should prioritise bus priority, rail capacity, land-use changes, station access and parking reform where these measurably make public transport competitive with driving.
Fourth, density around stations can create displacement.
Better transport may raise land values and rents, particularly in areas already under housing pressure. The answer is not to deny communities better access; it is to bind transport investment to inclusionary zoning, social and affordable housing delivery, renter protections and genuine community participation. This is why WR-SM02 must be implemented with WR-SM01 Housing rather than as a standalone infrastructure agenda.
Fifth, a national compact may blur accountability.
The Commonwealth funds, states operate, councils control streets and private contractors build. If roles are unclear, residents cannot know who is responsible for a cancelled bus, inaccessible station or cost blowout. The remedy is a published intergovernmental agreement with measurable service standards, named delivery agencies, open data, independently audited performance and clear local complaint pathways.
The evidence base itself has limits.
The 2021 Census journey-to-work data were affected by COVID-19 restrictions and working-from-home changes; international fare programs operate in very different urban forms, tax systems and network conditions; and project benefit–cost ratios depend on assumptions about demand, discount rates, land use and wider economic benefits. This dossier treats these limits as reasons for transparent pilots and evaluation – not reasons for paralysis.
Part 04
The Australian Design
How Rail & Public Transport would work in Australia
The Connected by Design Compact
National leadership, state delivery, local access and public accountability.
WeRise proposes a National Connected by Design Compact: a long-term Commonwealth–state–territory agreement to make reliable, accessible, low-emission mobility a basic public service. It would not centralise every train, bus or ferry in Canberra. States and territories would remain the principal operators and network planners for metropolitan and regional passenger transport; local government would remain essential for streets, stops, walking, cycling and place design. The Commonwealth would use stable co-investment, national standards, data transparency and independent appraisal to reward outcomes that individual jurisdictions cannot reliably fund alone.
The first priority is service before symbolism. Capital grants should be tied to published network plans that specify minimum all-day frequency, span of service, interchange quality, accessibility, reliability, safety and operating funding. A new rail line without frequent connecting buses, safe paths or affordable fares is incomplete infrastructure. Infrastructure Australia identifies frequency, integration with active and public modes, real-time information and links between centres, jobs and homes as key tests of whether public transport meets community need.8
Second, the Compact should align transport and housing. Commonwealth funding for large urban projects should require state planning reforms that permit substantial, well-designed social, affordable and market housing near frequent rail, light rail and rapid-bus corridors, while protecting tenants and preventing displacement. This cross-links directly with WR-SM01 Housing. The Australian Government’s National Urban Policy sets a framework for liveable, equitable, productive, sustainable and resilient urban growth, including safe, effective and affordable transport networks.7
Third, Australia needs one interoperable passenger experience. WeRise should develop a national framework for open, contactless and concession-compatible ticketing, consistent accessibility information, common performance reporting and a future national fare product. The initial fare priority should be a permanent national mobility concession for low-income people, students, apprentices, people receiving disability-related income support, older people on low incomes and people in regional and remote communities with limited alternatives. A universal flat-fare model should be trialled only where capacity and funding are adequate, with Queensland’s experience independently evaluated.5
Fourth, the rail program must be balanced. It should prioritise: metropolitan rail capacity and station accessibility; rail corridor preservation; regional rail reliability; freight rail and intermodal terminals where mode shift is commercially and environmentally credible; and rapid-bus projects in corridors where they can be delivered sooner or more cheaply. High-speed rail should proceed through transparent, staged corridor development and independent appraisal – not promotional claims. Infrastructure Australia’s Sydney–Newcastle evaluation found a benefit–cost ratio range of 0.8 to 1.05 and a net present value range from negative $10.5 billion to positive $2.6 billion, reflecting significant uncertainty at early design maturity.12
A realistic timeline is four phases: establish national standards, data and funding agreements in the first 18 months; begin fare-concession, accessibility and bus-priority upgrades within two years; deliver priority network and station packages over years two to seven; and progress major rail corridors through transparent stage gates over the following decade. Every major commitment should publish its full lifecycle costs, expected service outcomes and independent evaluation.
Part 05
People and Transition
Who Rail & Public Transport affects
Who Gets to Belong?
Transport access determines who can participate in daily Australian life.
The central beneficiaries of better rail and public transport are people currently forced to pay, drive or depend on others to participate in ordinary life. This includes households facing high transport costs; young people before they can drive; older people who no longer drive; people with disability; people who cannot safely travel alone through poorly designed stations or stops; students and apprentices; shift workers whose jobs begin before first services or end after the last; and people in outer suburbs, regional centres and remote communities where a car is often treated as compulsory.
The current system also harms people who do own cars. Car dependence imposes time, fuel, parking, repair, insurance and registration costs, and it leaves households exposed when a vehicle breaks down, a licence is lost, fuel prices rise or illness prevents driving. The 2021 Census recorded 6,347,498 employed Australians travelling to work as car drivers, representing 52.7% of employed people aged 15 years and over.1 This measure was shaped by pandemic working patterns, but it illustrates the large population for whom the road system is not merely an option – it is the dominant route to work.
Case study
A disability-support worker lives in an outer-metropolitan suburb and starts a 6:30 am shift at an aged-care facility. Her nearest bus is infrequent and begins too late; the train station is beyond safe walking distance and has no early connecting service. Her car is therefore not a preference but a condition of employment. A frequent early-morning bus connection, accessible footpaths and an integrated fare would give her resilience if the car fails and reduce the cost pressure on her household. This is an illustrative scenario, not an individual case record.
Case study
A 17-year-old in a regional city receives an apprenticeship opportunity 18 kilometres from home. Without a licence and with only limited daytime buses, the job depends on a parent’s availability to drive. A reliable regional bus–rail connection, youth fares and services aligned to shift start times would turn an opportunity into a practical choice. This is an illustrative scenario, not an individual case record.
Queensland’s experience indicates the scale at which affordability can matter. Its 2024–25 annual report recorded more than $349 million in customer savings after 50-cent fares were introduced, more than 176 million South East Queensland trips, and regional urban-bus patronage growth of more than 31% compared with the previous year.5 These are system-level results, not proof that every person benefited equally. They do, however, support the proposition that fare reductions can reach both metropolitan and regional users when they are simple and broadly available.
Opposition or caution will come from several directions. Treasury officials may question recurrent subsidies and opportunity cost; some transport economists may prefer service improvements or targeted concessions to universal fare cuts; motorists may oppose reallocating road space to buses, trams, walking or cycling; some residents may oppose density near stations; and freight interests may resist regulatory changes. These objections deserve an answer in design, not dismissal: transparent costings, staged implementation, targeted pilots, independent evaluation, community consultation and a clear commitment that better public transport expands mobility rather than punishing people who must drive.
Part 06
Related policies
Rail & Public Transport sits within a wider set of WeRise policies.
- Shelter & Movement: more WeRise policies in this pillar
- WeRise: all 29 policies across seven pillars
Notes
Sources and Supporting Documents
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. Understanding Place of Work Data. Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2022. abs.gov.au
- Climate Change Authority. 2024 Sector Pathways Review: Transport. Climate Change Authority. 2024. climatechangeauthority.gov.au
- Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics. Australian Infrastructure and Transport Statistics Yearbook 2025. Australian Government. 2025. bitre.gov.au
- Infrastructure Australia. Annual Performance Statement 2025. Infrastructure Australia. 2025. infrastructureaustralia.gov.au
- Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads. Annual Report 2024–25. Queensland Government. 2025. parliament.qld.gov.au
- Productivity Commission / Industry Commission. Rail Transport: Inquiry Report. Australian Government. 1991. pc.gov.au
- Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts. National Urban Policy. Australian Government. 2024. infrastructure.gov.au
- Infrastructure Australia. Strengthening Communities: Public Transport Infrastructure Gap. Infrastructure Australia. 2022. infrastructureaustralia.gov.au
- Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts. Verification and Assurance of Inland Rail Scope, Design, Delivery and Cost: Final Report. Australian Government. 2025. infrastructure.gov.au
- Queensland Parliamentary Budget Office. Election Commitment Report 2025–3216: 50 Cent Public Transport Fares. Queensland Parliamentary Budget Office. 2025. pbo.gov.au
- Infrastructure Australia. High Speed Rail Newcastle to Sydney: Stage 3 Evaluation Report. Infrastructure Australia. 2025. infrastructureaustralia.gov.au
- Bundesministerium für Verkehr. Evaluation Deutschlandticket 2024. Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport, Germany. 2024. bmv.de
- Wallimann, C., et al. Austria’s KlimaTicket: Assessing the Short-Term Impacts of a National Public Transport Ticket. Swiss Transport Research Conference. 2024. strc.ch
- Pires, E. Analysing the Effects of Fare-Free Public Transport in Luxembourg. Spatial Economics. 2024. spatialeconomics.nl
- Deutsches Zentrum für Schienenverkehrsforschung. The Cost of Commuting and the Influence of the Deutschlandticket. German Centre for Rail Traffic Research. 2026. dzsf.bund.de
- Australian Railway Association. Future of Freight Policy. Australian Railway Association. Undated. ara.net.au
- Climate Council. Shifting Gear: The Path to Cleaner Transport. Climate Council. 2023. climatecouncil.org.au
- Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. Cinq ans de gratuité des transports publics: un bilan positif pour la mobilité au Luxembourg. Government of Luxembourg. 2025. gouvernement.lu
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